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Abstract
Companies often send non-binding messages to their competitors, to consumers, to channel
members and to various other recipients. When such messages are in the form of price
signals, they tend to make antitrust authorities uneasy since it is widely believed that price
signaling can and does serve as a collusion facilitating mechanism. We conducted
experimental posted-offer markets with multiple competitive equilibria, and found that
contrary to expectations, markets in which sellers could engage in cheap talk had lower
contract prices than markets without cheap talk opportunities.
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Companies often send non-binding messages to their competitors, to consumers, to 
channel members and to various other recipients.  When such messages are in the form of 
price signals, they tend to make antitrust authorities uneasy since it is believed that price 
signaling can and does serve as a collusion-facilitating mechanism. 
 
The theoretical literature on non-binding signaling games makes two opposing 
predictions.  On the one hand, there exists the possibility that market outcomes may be 
improved when a non-binding signal is transmitted, especially when messages are self-
committing (Farrell 1988).  On the other hand, “cheap talk” can degenerate into noise 
because of the ubiquity of non-communicative equilibria: since each player knows that 
the message sent by the other is non-binding, there is a tendency to disregard the 
message, and all that is left under repeated play is uncommunicative “noise” wherein the 
opportunity to send messages does not facilitate collusion. 
 
We used posted-offer markets in the tradition of experimental economics to 
evaluate, under laboratory conditions, which of these two effects of cheap talk would 
occur.  To accentuate the effects of cheap talk, we used the simple yet elegant “box” 
market design with multiple competitive equilibria.  We found that cheap talk did not 
serve sellers as a collusion-facilitating device.  Instead, seller profits in markets with 
cheap talk were lower than in markets without cheap-talk opportunities.  Contract prices 
too, were lower in cheap-talk markets.  In our experiments, cheap talk did not facilitate 
collusion in posted-offer markets with real buyers; it was also ineffectual in markets 
where the demand was simulated.   
 
We note that prior experimental studies on the effect of cheap talk have provided 
mixed results; see for example reviews by Haan, Schoonbeek and Winkel (2005) and 
Crawford (1998) on experimental results in cheap-talk games.   For the present project, 
therefore, we used a market design that was meant to be conducive to the emergence of 
collusion in the presence of cheap-talk opportunities. In the box design (first used by 
Davis and Williams 1988, and shown in Figure 1), since supply equals demand, so long 
as sellers set prices lower than buyers’ reservation price, all units can be sold.  Thus, 
collusion in prices can readily emerge in this design when sellers have the opportunity to 
engage in cheap talk.  Our experimental markets were thus designed to facilitate 
collusion; it is interesting to note that in spite of this, we found that contract prices were 
lower in markets with cheap talk compared to markets where cheap talk was not 
permitted.   
 
2.  Method 
We used standard posted-offer market procedures (Davis and Holt, 1993) with the box 
market design.  In each market, players interacted in a non-computerized face-to-face 
setting.  Since we were studying the effect of non-binding messages on market outcomes, 
we had two experimental conditions: in the cheap-talk market condition, sellers were 
afforded the opportunity to send non-binding messages to each other prior to deciding on 
their own price; in the markets without cheap talk, sellers did not have this opportunity to 
pre-announce the price they intended to charge.     2 
  In every market, sellers had information on their cost structure and decided on the 
price they would charge.  They were not given any information about the demand in the 
market.  
 
We conducted two studies using this design with multiple competitive equilibria: 
Study 1 had real buyers, and Study 2 had simulated buyers. 
 
In Study 1 with real buyers, two sellers and two buyers interacted with each other 
in each posted-offer market.  Buyers were given information on how much they valued 
the commodity being sold, and each buyer independently decided on the quantity (s)he 
wanted to buy, the objective being to achieve as high a surplus as possible.  Buyers had 
no knowledge of sellers’ costs.  
 
In Study 2, we studied the effect of non-binding messages in the context of 
simulated demand.  In these markets, which had the same demand and supply schedules 
as the markets with real buyers, there were only sellers and no buyers.  Instead, buyer 
behavior was simulated using the standard buying rule that assumes fully demand-
revealing buyers: if a seller posts a price below the reservation price, all her units are 
sold.  Since no buyer withholding is possible under simulated demand, we were able to 
study the effect of non-binding signals without the influence of strategic buyer behavior.   
 
In all markets, we used standard posted-offer procedures which included trained 
and supervised research assistants, the reading of instructions at the beginning of each 
market, a short quiz to test subjects’ comprehension of these instructions, and debriefing 
at the end of the game.  Practice sessions were also conducted as trial periods in each 
market to ensure that there was no confusion about the posted-offer experimental 
procedure in subjects’ minds.    
 
 
3.  Findings 
3.1  Prices lower with cheap talk 
We see from figure 2 that contract prices were significantly lower when sellers engaged 
in non-binding price signaling (p
contract=9.22, p
contract
signal=7.84, significantly different at p 
< .01).   This result is quite contrary to what antitrust authorities are wary about.  Similar 




signal=10.00, p < 0.05).    
 
Even if we consider stabilized prices in the terminal stages of the games, lower 




signal=10.75, p<0.05).  The finding that prices are lower when 
sellers engage in non-binding signaling is noteworthy from an antitrust point of view.  
Consumer advocates and antitrust authorities have often maintained that the posting of 
intended prices results in higher prices to consumers.  Our research suggests the reverse 
appears to be true: affording sellers the opportunity to transmit non-binding messages 
resulted in significantly lower prices to the buyer. 
   3 
One might wonder why the prices in figures 2 and 3 are below the unit production 
cost psc in the early stages of the games.  This is because the prices shown are average 
contract prices and not posted prices.  Average contract prices
1 were depressed for 
various reasons, as clarified through figure 4 which depicts a representative posted-offer 
market PO-211 with real buyers.  Prices posted by both sellers in this market were well 
above the unit production cost psc=$9.00.  In period 4, Seller 1 posted a price of $11.50, 
which corresponded to the buyers’ reservation price
2 pne, so this offer was accepted, as 
indicated by the ‘+’ sign in the figure.  Seller 2 posted a price of $12.00, which was 
higher than the buyers’ reservation price of pne=$11.50 so there was no sale, as indicated 
by the ‘-’ sign.  Thus, when sellers priced above buyer valuations, units were not traded, 
which resulted in depressed mean contract prices.  Sometimes buyers refused to buy even 
at reasonable prices; such behavior too had the effect of depressing contract prices.  For 
instance in period 16, both sellers posted a price of $11.00, but there was no sale, even 
though the posted prices were lower than the buyers’ reservation price pne=$11.50.  
Reacting to this, Seller 1 immediately lowered his price in the next period and made a 
sale.   
 
3.2  Volume traded lower with cheap talk 
Interestingly, as seen in figure 5, fewer units were bought when sellers engaged in non-
binding price signaling  (v=3.96, vsignal=3.36, p < 0.01).   This reflects an attempt by 
buyers to punish sellers in the signaling condition for setting higher prices in the first 
place.    
 
Figure 6a provides more clarity to this issue.  Posted prices were clearly higher 
when signaling opportunity was provided (p=10.73, psignal=11.39, p<0.05).   Sellers used 
the signaling opportunity and urged the other seller to price higher.  As prices climbed 
higher, buyer withholding was more severe as buyers cut down on the number of units 
purchased.  In figure 6b we see prices posted by a seller in a representative market PO-
112.  In the first period, the seller initially announced a price of $20 but immediately 
reneged on his promise by posting a price of only $15.  This is what typically happened 
in every market, causing non-binding messages to lose their impact over time and 
deteriorate into meaningless “babbling”.  In subsequent periods, the seller can be seen 
urging his competitor to post higher prices by announcing in each period a  price higher 
than the posted price of the earlier period.  
                                                 
1  We use the standard definition of contract price, namely the price at which the contract for a 
sold unit is struck in a market.  It is computed as the total revenue generated in the market for any 
given period divided by the total number of units sold in that period.  It is different from the 
posted selling price since it is meant to capture the average price of a sold unit. 
 
2  A price of $11.50 also corresponds to the Nash equilibrium of the stage game in the box design 
since neither seller has an incentive to deviate from this price given that the other seller prices at 
pne.  It is also the highest competitive equilibrium price.  As mentioned earlier, in the box design 
with its constant marginal valuation and cost structure, sellers can use cheap talk to coordinate on 
any of the multiple competitive equilibria in the [psc, pne] range.  
     4 
3.3  Buyer profits higher in cheap-talk markets 
Buyer profits were higher when sellers were permitted to transmit non-binding price 
signals in markets with simulated buyers (π
buyer=0.92, π
buyer
signal=2.49, p<0.01).  In 




signal=4.43, ns).  Also, as seen in figures 7a and 7b, seller 




in simulated-demand markets and π
seller=5.77, π
seller
signal=3.96, p<0.01 with real buyers). 
This could lead one to question whether such signaling can serve as an effective 
collusion-facilitating mechanism.  These findings are contrary to the claim by consumer 
advocacy groups that allowing sellers to send non-binding signals is detrimental to 
consumers.  
 
3.4  Efficiency lower in cheap-talk markets 
We found that signaling led to a loss of efficiency in our experimental markets.   
Efficiency was computed as the percentage of maximum surplus extracted, and we found 
that markets devoid of signaling opportunities tended to be more efficient than markets 
with signaling opportunities, largely because of the trading loss in the signaling 
condition.  This result was more pronounced in Study 1 where we had real buyers, since 
buyer withholding came into play (e
real=65.81%, e
real
signal=55.73%, p<0.01). It was not as 
pronounced for the simulated demand setting in Study 2; here, markets with and without 




signal=80.37%, ns).   
 
4.  Conclusion 
In our markets, as hypothesized, the Nash equilibrium did seem to exert a gravitational 
effect on prices since prices tended to gravitate upwards with repeated play.  When 
signaling opportunities were available, sellers appeared to urge the other seller to raise 
prices in an attempt to boost profits.  However, these signals disintegrated into 
meaningless “noise” and lost their effectiveness as the game progressed.  Fewer units 
were traded when sellers engaged in price signaling, reflecting an attempt by buyers to 
punish sellers for setting higher prices in the signaling condition. 
 
While consumer advocates and antitrust authorities have feared that price 
signaling results in higher prices paid by consumers, the reverse effect was observed in 
our studies.  Affording sellers the opportunity to transmit non-binding price signaling 
messages resulted in significantly lower prices to the buyer.  An analysis of equity effects 
showed that the distribution of surplus was tilted in favor of buyers in the signaling 
condition, another finding noteworthy from the antitrust point of view.  In both our 
studies, buyer profits were higher and seller profits lower, when sellers were permitted to 
engage in non-binding price signaling, which could lead one to question allegations that 
such signaling is a collusion-facilitation mechanism.   
 
Of course, we do acknowledge that laboratory markets are far removed from real-
world markets and extreme caution should be exercised in extrapolating findings from 
experimental studies to real life situations.  Our study is, to use Roth’s words, meant to be   5 
“part of the dialogue that experimenters carry on with one another” rather than 
“whispering in the ears of princes.” 
3   
 
                                                 
3   Roth 1995 (p 22) uses “Whispering in the Ears of Princes” to refer to a dialog between 
experimenters and policymakers, i.e. experiments motivated to answer questions raised by 
regulatory authorities.   6 
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Figure 6a
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Figure 7b
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p   < 0.01 
Figure 7a 
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